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Abstract— With the increasing scale and complexity of cloud systems and big data analytics platforms, it is becoming more and 
more challenging to understand and diagnose the processing of a service request in such distributed platforms. One way that 
helps to deal with this problem is to capture the complete end-to-end execution path of service requests among all involved 
components accurately. This paper presents REPTrace, a generic methodology for capturing such execution paths in a 
transparent fashion. We analyze a comprehensive list of execution scenarios, and propose principles and algorithms for 
generating the end-to-end request execution path for all the scenarios. Moreover, this paper presents an anomaly detection 
approach exploiting request execution paths to detect anomalies of the execution during request processing. The experiments on 
four popular distributed platforms with different workloads show that REPTrace can transparently capture the accurate request 
execution path with reasonable latency and negligible network overhead. Fault injection experiments show that execution 
anomalies are detected with high recall (96%). 
Index Terms— Anomaly detection, cloud system, distributed system, end-to-end tracing, execution path, service request 
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1 INTRODUCTION
istributed platforms like cloud platforms (e.g. IBM 
Cloud, Amazon AWS, OpenStack and SoftLayer) and 
analytics platforms (e.g. IBM Watson Health Cloud [32], 
Spark and Hadoop) are composed of numerous services 
and components in multiple levels to support various ap-
plications. Expertise on such platforms and hosted services 
is critical for the enterprises of platform providers such as 
IBM, Microsoft, Amazon, and Google, to maintain and im-
prove the platforms and services.  
However, it is challenging for the platform provider en-
terprises to obtain and keep the up-to-date expertise on the 
platforms and hosted services/applications because, i) 
new services and applications continue to onboard the 
platforms; ii) softwares of such platforms and their hosted 
services/applications have been developed by different 
vendors or teams and may be owned by different parties, 
and source code of them may be unavailable;  iii) the sys-
tem softwares and the services are under continuous and 
rapid updates (e.g. OpenStack is released every 6 months 
[29]), iv) there is frequent flow of personnel in opera-
tion/development teams (this makes the knowledge trans-
fer a headache for most large providers of computing plat-
forms). Actually, it is reported that up to 60% of the soft-
ware engineering effort is spent on understanding the 
software system [30].  
Drawing message flows of individual request’s pro-
cessing among the components of a distributed platform 
was demonstrated to be an effective way to understand 
and analyze behavior of cloud platforms. For instance, the 
analysis of OpenStack’s release evolvements [28] pre-
sented manually drawn message flows among Open-
Stack’s components for identifying behavior changes in 
different OpenStack releases.  
Manual construction of message flows or other captur-
ings of system behaviors is inefficient towards the goal of 
obtaining/keeping up-to-date understanding/expertise 
on such a platform and hosted services. Moreover, we in-
tend to capture the complete end-to-end execution path of pro-
cessing an individual request among all involved components of 
the platform. We believe the complete path conveys a holis-
tic view of the platform’s behavior during the processing 
of the request, and this holistic view, with in-depth details, 
boosts the up-to-date understanding/knowledge and even 
diagnosis of request processing behavior (as demonstrated 
in our work in [25]), especially in our specific context 
where the softwares of the platform and hosted ser-
vices/applications are from different ven-
dors/teams/owners and under constant changes, relevant 
source code is unavailable or rapidly evolving, and the 
platforms have frequent flow of personnel. This capturing 
of the end-to-end path in our specific context truly differentiates 
our work from previous ones, which are discussed below, and 
is attractive to enterprises providing such heterogeneous 
platforms like IBM Watson Health Cloud.  
A number of technologies in current literature try to 
tackle a similar problem (end-to-end tracing). Stardust [15] 
is designed to trace a specific distributed storage system 
and requires manual modification of the system source 
code. Xtrace [13] extends common network protocols to 
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support request identifier propagation by means of special 
hardware and application support of the protocol exten-
sion. Google’s Dapper [6] instruments Google’s internal 
homogeneous control flow/RPC libraries to do the tracing. 
It requires all traced components use the instrumented in-
ternal libraries. Pinpoint [11] instruments J2EE libraries to 
accurately correlate network communication events by 
adding request identifier in HTTP headers. The tracing 
tools of Pivot [3], Magpie [12], HDFS HTrace [17] and Fa-
cebook’s Canopy [1] are similar to Dapper and Pinpoint in 
that they instrument specific middleware or vendor cus-
tom libraries and the instrumentations enable the tracing 
capabilities. Other related work e.g. statistical approaches 
are discussed in Section 6.  
What we desire is a mechanism of capturing the com-
plete request execution path for distributed platforms 
bearing the four challenges above. The existing technolo-
gies above do not apply in our target situations where the 
challenges i), ii) and iii) are combined. A project close to 
our work is vPath [7]. This project traces communications 
of distributed systems/applications by pairing each net-
work message’ sending (by the sender thread S) and re-
ceiving (by the receiver thread R) via the TCP/IP socket 
and connection information (e.g. source IP, source port, 
destination IP, destination port, source thread ID and des-
tination thread ID). Because vPath relies on pairing of 
TCP/IP socket and connection information for identifying 
causality, this makes vPath work only in one type of com-
munication/thread pattern: a) S sends message to R via 
connection c and blocks itself; b) if R replies to S via con-
nection c then S resumes its execution, or if R sends mes-
sage to another thread T via another connection d, R blocks 
itself until it receives reply from T via d. For any other com-
munication pattern or thread pattern, vPath will fail (as the 
vPath authors stated in [7] and our experiments also 
showed). These other patterns include asynchronous com-
munication, thread forking or thread handover during re-
quest processing, connectionless communication (UDP), 
connection pool, event driven and thread pool. 
Our work was motivated by vPath. We intend to build 
a general mechanism that traces distributed platforms’ 
processing of individual requests covering most, if not all, 
execution scenarios, after we found vPath did not work in 
our platforms due to the pattern constraint. We also intend 
to capture the complete end-to-end path while vPath re-
ports path fragments for a request because the patterns be-
yond what vPath supports are common.  
In this paper a Request Execution Path (REP as acro-
nym) is defined as the complete path of processing a spe-
cific service/job request. Specifically, the REP 1) covers all 
of the executions of the given distributed platform's com-
ponents in processing a specific request (at a given granu-
larity such as library/system calls), including executions of 
those components’ processes and threads as well as the 
communications among them during the processing; 2) 
identifies all these executions, and links them together ac-
cording to the accurate causal relationships among them to 
form an integral unseparated view of the platform's pro-
cessing.  
We propose Request Execution Path Trace (REPTrace) to 
capture the REP. REPTrace intercepts runtime events such 
as common library/system calls at the operating system 
level (either within a physical machine, VM, or container). 
Principles and algorithms are proposed for identifying the 
relationships among the events. Then REPTrace stitches all 
the events of one request’s processing together using the 
identified relationships, and produces the complete REP. 
To satisfy the challenges in our problem context above, we 
i) perform comprehensive analysis of execution scenarios 
about how distributed systems process requests, ii) modify 
network messages with extra information for pairing the 
sending and receiving of the same message, iii) maintain 
the context of each request’s processing to differentiate it 
from other concurrent requests, and iv) devise algorithms 
to combine these three items and maneuver a set of rele-
vant library/system calls for tracing the analyzed execu-
tion scenarios.  
As a demonstration of REPtrace usage, this paper also 
presents an anomaly detection approach that leverages 
REPs to detect anomalies during processing of a request. 
Besides anomaly detection, REPTrace helps understand be-
havior of complicated distributed platforms [25]. In sum-
mary, this paper makes the following contributions: 
• We analyze execution scenarios and event relation-
ships in these scenarios for request processing of distrib-
uted platforms and identify event relationships in all the 
execution scenarios. This analysis is the basis for REPTrace. 
• We propose REPTrace for constructing complete 
REPs without code instrumentation, and implement REP-
Trace on Linux systems. Novel algorithms are devised for 
the REP construction and no specific communication or 
thread patterns are assumed in REPTrace. As far as we 
know, there is no prior art of distributed tracing that tries 
to address the comprehensive communication and execu-
tion scenarios in the request execution path as we handle. 
• A novel anomaly detection approach based on REP-
Trace is proposed to detect execution anomalies by discov-
ering deviations of the execution paths from normal ones.  
• We evaluate REPTrace and the anomaly detection 
method with extensive experiments in terms of perfor-
mance overhead, anomaly detection precision, recall and 
F1-measure on different distributed platforms. Our exper-
imental results show that with a 4.5% execution latency 
overhead the REPTrace-based anomaly detection approach 
detects functional anomalies with 93% precision and 96% 
recall, and detects performance anomalies with 74% preci-
sion and 74% recall. 
2 OVERVIEW OF REP CONSTRUCTION 
If we look into the execution of a request processing, we 
see the execution consists of the following sequence: … - 
event – thread execution – event – thread execution - … Here 
event indicates a system call (or a LIBC call encapsulating a 
system call) that is of our interest, and thread execution is 
one thread’s continuous execution between one event and 
its successive event. After removing thread execution from 
the sequence, the execution process is then denoted as the 
sequence … - event – event - …. In this paper we use such 
sequences of events to denote the execution of request 
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processing. Suppose an event e1 has its immediate succes-
sive event e2 in the sequence; we call e1 parent of e2 and e2 
child of e1, and their relationship is denoted as e1->e2 (par-
ent->child). Note that one event may have multiple parents 
when it is in multiple sequences (we will elaborate on this 
in Section 2.3.2). 
2.1 Analysis of Execution Scenarios 
The following is a comprehensive list of scenarios (illus-
trated in Fig. 1) that may be involved during service/job 
request processing based on our experience and analysis of 
real-world IT paltforms. We believe the comprehensive list 
covers most, if not all, of the common execution scenarios 
in request processing. We do this analysis as we intend to 
support scenarios as many as possible rather than limited 
patterns only.  
a) Continuous execution within a thread; 
b) The current thread creates another thread and 
passes the handling of the request to the new thread. The 
current thread may stop processing (e.g. sleep), or continue 
processing this request;  
c) The current process forks a process, and passes the 
handling of the request to the new process; The current 
process may stop or continue processing this request;  
d) The current process/thread sends a message to an-
other process/thread, which may be on the same machine 
or a different machine. Then the latter process/thread be-
gins the processing of the request. Network communica-
tion and other similar mechanisms, like pipe, are covered 
in this scenario; The current process/thread may stop or 
continue processing this request;  
e) The current process/thread synchronizes the pro-
cessing of the request with another existing process/thread 
using certain IPC (Inter-Process Communication) mecha-
nism such as process wait, thread join, signal, lock/unlock, 
semaphore, etc.; 
f) The current process/thread saves the request (or its 
intermediate state) in a message queue. Then a different 
process/thread picks up the request (or the intermediate 
state) from the message queue and begins processing;  
g) The current process/thread passes the handling of 
the request to another existing process/thread using 
shared memory, shared variables, or mapped device. 
 
Fig. 1. Illustration of different categories of execution scenarios (note 
these are not parts of the same complete REP) 
2.2 Event Relationships 
The relationships between any parent event and its child 
event in the listed execution scenarios are summarized as 
the following types.  
1. Temporal successiveness within the same thread (TCR) in 
scenario a and other scenarios (e.g. in asynchronous mes-
saging mode a thread continues processing of the request 
after sending message). Examples are e4->e5, e1->e2, e6-
>e8, e13->e14->e17, e15->e16 in Fig. 1. Note that only those 
events that participate processing of the current request are 
considered, and the events of the same thread’s processing 
of other requests in concurrency should be excluded for the 
REP generation of this request.  
2. Causality of thread creation and process creation (ToPCR) in 
scenarios b and c (e1->e3, e6->e7, e13->e15). In this type of 
relationship, the first event in the new thread/process is 
the child event of the thread-creation/process-creation 
event in the parent thread/process. 
3. Causality of communication between threads/processes 
(COMR) in scenario d (e9->e10). The communication events 
can be classified into two types, message sending type and 
message receiving type, which are respectively referred as 
send and recv hereafter. The send event in the sender thread 
is the parent of the corresponding recv event in the receiver 
thread. 
4. Causality of synchronization among threads (SYNR) in sce-
nario e (e16->e17 where pthread_join is the synchronization 
method). Depending on the synchronization mechanism, 
either the event that performs the synchronization is the 
parent of the first event in the target thread after it receives 
the synchronization signal, or the event that causes the 
syschronization signal in the target thread is the parent of 
the event that happens immediately after dealing with the 
syschroniztion signal in another thread. 
5. Causality via data dependency between threads/processes 
(DDR) in scenarios f and g (e11->e12). The data dependency 
is read-after-write dependency between threads/processes. 
The event that writes data in one thread is the parent of the 
event that reads the written value in another thread. If the 
write/read of the data is not via a system call but via direct 
memory access (e.g. shared memory, shared variable), the 
event that is immediately before the write is the parent 
event, and the event that is immediately after the read is the 
child event.  
The event relationship types of 1~4 (scenarios a~e) are 
about manipulations or interactions of system control ob-
jects, i.e. thread, process, signal, communication, etc.; they 
indicate control flow of the request processing among 
threads/processes. The type of 5 (scenarios f and g) indi-
cates data flow of the request processing among 
threads/processes. 
2.3 Construction of REP 
REP construction consists of two steps: generation of 
events and linking of events. For simplicity our description 
of REP construction here assumes that events are all gener-
ated in the first step, and then the linking is performed over 
the entire set of events in the second step. But in reality, the 
two steps on different events are performed in parallel, i.e. 
the linkings of certain events are being performed while 
certain other events are generated. 
2.3.1 Event Generation 
We intercept system calls of interest, or LIBC calls that en-
capsulate those system calls, and generate events during 
the interception. Table 1 lists the categories of calls that 
should be intercepted for event generation. According to 
the discussions above, the calls we are interested in are 
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mostly of four categories: thread manipulation, process 
manipulation, network communication and synchroniza-
tion. Certain other calls are also intercepted.  
TABLE 1: LIBC CALLS INTERCEPTED FOR EVENT GENERATION 
Category Examples 
Thread manipulation pthread_create, pthread_join, pthread_self, pthread_detach, pthread_cancel 
Process manipulation fork, vfork, exec 
Network communication send, recv, write, read, sendmsg 
Synchronization wait, waitpid, pthread_join, signal 
Other open. close, malloc, syscall 
When a system call is intercepted by REPTrace, the orig-
inal system call is encapsulated and invoked, both the pa-
rameters and results of the call are captured, and then a 
trace event for the system call calling event is generated. 
The trace event has common attributes that exist for cate-
gories of events, as well as attributes specific to the event’s 
category. Common attributes include event ID, call info, 
thread info, process info, node info, local time info, event linking 
info. Here call info includes the name of the intercepted sys-
tem/LIBC call as well as the parameters and return value 
of the call; thread info, process info and node info include in-
formation about the thread, process, and machine node 
where the interception occurs; event linking info includes at-
tributes our algorithm creates or uses to link events and 
form REP, and is discussed in the Section below. The event-
category specific attributes include IP address, port num-
ber, etc. Every system call calling event has a correspond-
ing trace event (we use event and trace event interchange-
ably hereafter). 
 
2.3.2 Event Linking 
All of the generated trace events are linked to form the REP 
via their parent-child relationship. So, the key of event 
linking is to identify the parent for each event. Here we de-
scribe how the parent is identified for any event of the five 
categories of event relationships. One event may have mul-
tiple parents if more than one rule below applies.  
Algorithm 1 describes the event linking for event rela-
tionship types of 1~4. The linking for type 4 is lines 3-4, for 
type 3 is lines 7-9, for type 1 is lines 11-13, and for type 2 is 
lines 14-21. After Algorithm 1 is executed, the linking for 
type 5 (data flow of the request processing among 
threads/processes) is performed.  
• Type 3: Causality of communication between threads/pro-
cesses. We insert a unique ID, called MSG_ID, into each 
transmitted message at the send event, and then extract this 
MSG_ID from the received message at the recv event. This 
MSG_ID is one attribute of the event linking info. For any 
recv event, its parent is the send event with the same 
MSG_ID. Unlike vPath which uses TCP connection and 
socket information to pair send event and corresponding 
recv event, our mechanism of message labelling does not 
rely on specific communication pattern or thread pattern 
for doing the pairing.  
The MSG_ID includes the length information of the 
message. When a message sent by one send event is frag-
mented and received by multiple recv events, or messages 
sent by multiple send events are received in one or multiple 
recv events, the length information is leveraged to identify 
message borders and merge/split the received fragments 
into original messages transmitted at send events (details 
of implementation are in Section 3). As a result, one send 
event maps to one recv event with the same MSG_ID. 
• Type 1: Temporal successiveness within the same thread. 
The thread info, process info, node info of events are exploited 
to find those events generated within the same thread of 
the given event. Then local time info is exploited to identify 
which event has the time immediately ahead of the given 
event, i.e. the parent event.  
One challenge is to exclude those events that do not par-
ticipate processing of the current request. For instance, in 
the thread pool pattern a thread had been created long be-
fore the current request was initiated, and those events be-
fore the current request should be excluded. In another ex-
ample, a thread may be serving multiple requests concur-
rently, and we should exclude those events of processing 
other requests.  
We define a unique ID, MSG_CTX_ID, to aid maintain-
ing the request’s context and excluding irrelevant events. 
The intuition behind the MSG_CTX_ID concept is to group 
those local events that are related to the same individual 
message. As the initial service/job request received by the 
computing platform is a message, the grouped events by 
this message’s context are related to processing of this re-
quest. If one of the grouped events is a send event, its cor-
responding recv event is identified by the MSG_ID, and the 
message of this recv event creates a new message context 
with a new MSG_CTX_ID. Therefore, the basic idea is to 
leverage the cascading use of MSG_CTX_ID and MSG_ID 
for grouping all events related to the original request. 
MSG_CTX_ID is also an attribute of event linking info.  
More formally, MSG_CTX_ID is defined as a unique 
identifier of the continuous computation from the sending 
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or receiving of one message (event A) to the sending or re-
ceiving of the next message (event B). All events between 
event A and event B along the request execution have the 
same MSG_CTX_ID. If event A is a recv event, a new 
MSG_CTX_ID is created and marked for both event A and 
those events after A (and before B); if event A is a send 
event, the event A is still marked with the old 
MSG_CTX_ID for purpose of event stitching, and a new 
MSG_CTX_ID is created for those events after A (and be-
fore B). The MSG_CTX_ID of event B is similarly assigned 
as there is a next message after B.  
Fig. 3 gives an example of MSG_ID and MSG_CTX_ID 
propagation along events during request processing. In 
this figure (and also in our implementation), the events fol-
lowing a send event has the MSG_CTX_ID value same as 
the send event’s MSG_ID to reduce overhead of generating 
unique IDs (the fork event has id1 as MSG_CTX_ID). Note 
that the MSG_CTX_ID may propagate across pro-
cess/thread creation, as shown in Host 1’s bottom read 
event which is the first event in a newly-forked process.  
 
Fig. 2. An example of MSG_ID and MSG_CTX_ID propagation 
among events (each tuple in the figure is <call ID, MSG_ID, 
MSG_CTX_ID>, a simplified version of the event) 
• Type 2: Causality of thread creation and process creation. 
The thread/process-creation event’s call info has the ID of 
the newly created thread/process in the call’s return value. 
So if a given event is the first event of a thread/process, we 
search those thread/process-creation events and identify 
its parent. MSG_ID and MSG_CTX_ID are used to exclude 
irrelevant events as well.  
• Type 4: Causality of synchronization among threads. For 
each of the synchronization mechanisms such as process 
waitpid, thread join, signal, etc., we define its specific cau-
sality identification method. For example, waitpid() blocks 
the calling process A (the current process) and waits for the 
specified process B to terminate or change state (stopped 
or resumed or signaled). Then process B’s last event before 
B’s termination or state change is the parent of process A’s 
event that is immediately after the waitpid() in the control 
flow order. The waitpid() event of process A is also the par-
ent of this process A’s event. Similarly, specific identifica-
tions of event causal relationships associated with thread 
joining, signals, lock/unlock and other IPC mechanisms 
are defined correspondingly based on their semantics in 
manipulating execution behavior. 
• Type 5: Causality via data dependency between 
threads/processes. General accurate analysis of data depend-
ency relationships along individual traces transparently is 
a difficult problem to tackle. This paper mainly addresses 
the construction of REP using control-flow relationships 
rather than data-flow relationships, as handling data 
dependency relationships is a radically different topic than 
handling control-flow relationships. However, we are still 
able to transparently identify data dependency relation-
ships in these scenarios in certain situations, by leveraging 
certain IDs which are typically available in many standard 
queue protocols and middleware. Such IDs include mes-
sage ID, job ID, session ID, etc. For example, in Apache Ac-
tiveMQ, there is a unique message ID in every message 
header and every job also has a job ID when submitting 
and executing a job in Hadoop. The data writing and read-
ing events can be correlated by these data IDs. So, in our 
implemented REPTrace tool we identify the relationships 
of type 5 in only these situations. 
If we do not address the data-induced causality be-
tween threads/processes (e.g. message queues) during 
event linking, the achieved REP is not a single complete 
path, but comprised of several path segments. In our ex-
periments REPTrace reports 6 paths for a single job's pro-
cessing when we do not consider such causalities, because 
job queues or message queues are used in Hadoop. After 
we leverage the Hadoop job ID and RPC ID to address this 
type of causality, REPTrace produces one execution path 
for one job request, as we expected.  
2.3.3 REP Representation 
As an event may have multiple parents, the formed REP 
via event linking is represented as a graph. Because each 
linking represents a local temporal successiveness or a cau-
sality which is always uni-directed, there is no cycle in the 
formed REP. So the REP is actually a directed acyclic graph 
(DAG).  
A REP is built for one request’s processing. Each node 
of the DAG represents an event and each edge denotes an 
event relationship. Each node has zero or a number of child 
nodes. All the generated events during processing of the 
request, from the request entering the distributed system 
until the system replying final results for the request, form 
the DAG to represent the complete REP. 
There might be inconsistency among reads/writes of 
the same variable/memory location in Type 5 of event re-
lationship (see Section 2.2) if the traced software has unre-
solved race conditions. If such an inconsistency occurs the 
REP graph might or might not contain a cycle (we are not 
sure). But we do not see any cycle in our experiments, 
maybe because both the probability of activating race con-
dition bugs of the traced softwares (they are widely used 
mature softwares), and the probability of such incon-
sistency resulting in a cycle in the REP, are quite low. The 
linkings of the other four types of event relationships in-
volve either local information only (e.g. local timestamp 
within a thread) or matching of certain values (process id, 
thread id, MSG_ID, etc.), and do not incur any incon-
sistency that may result in a cycle in the REP.  
3 SYSTEM DESIGN  
REPTrace consists of a REPAgent (and an optional Local 
Generator) on each host of the traced distributed system, 
as well as a Central Generator (see Fig. 3).  
   REPAgent intercepts LIBC calls of the host via the 
recv, id1, id3
send, id4, id3
recv, id2, id5
recv, id4, id6
Host 2Host 1 Host 3
send, id1, id0
send, id2, id1
fork, null, id1
read, null, id1
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LD_PRELOAD mechanism, and emits events to the Cen-
tral Generator. Our current implementation intercepts 28 
LIBC calls in total and emits 28 different types of events, 
including those examples listed in Table 1. The Central 
Generator collects these events and runs the event linking 
in an asynchronous mode (so the performance impact to 
the request processing is minimized). Then Central Gener-
ator stores the complete REP of every request in the repos-
itory. If further performance impact minimization is re-
quired, an optional Local Generator can buffer REPAgent's 
events to reduce overhead incurred by the communication 
to the Central Generator. Then the Local Generator can 
transmit the trace events to the Central Generator when the 
system has light load. Due to page limitation, we do not 
discuss details of this performance optimization. 
 Fig. 3. System architecture of REPTrace 
REPAgent Behavior. On intercepting a message-send-
ing call, REPAgent a) creates a new MSG_ID and adds the 
MSG_ID at the beginning of the message, b) invokes the 
original call to transmit the modified message, c) creates a 
new MSG_CTX_ID and performs relevant bookkeeping, d) 
prepares an event and emits it to the Central Generator.  
On intercepting a message-receiving call, REPAgent a) 
invokes the original call to get the message, b) extracts the 
MSG_ID from the message, c) creates a new MSG_CTX_ID 
and performs relevant bookkeeping, d) prepares an event 
and emits it to the Central Generator, and e) returns the 
message to the upper level of the system.  
On interception of other calls, REPAgent performs 
MSG_CTX_ID bookkeeping, prepares an event and emits 
it to the Central Generator besides invocation of the origi-
nal call.  
MSG_ID and MSG_CTX_ID are of the same format: a 2-
byte starting delimiter, an 8-byte length indicator, a 
unique-value identifier (UUID) and finally a 2-byte ending 
delimiter. The length indicator in MSG_ID denotes the 
length of the original message before modification, and is 
unused in MSG_CTX_ID. 
Each thread has a current MSG_CTX_ID. REPAgent 
maintains a table of the current MSG_CTX_IDs for all in-
volved threads in the host. On intercepting a message-
sending or message-receiving call, the thread’s current 
MSG_CTX_ID is updated with the newly created 
MSG_CTX_ID. When an event (not a recv event) is 
generated, the event’s MSG_CTX_ID is assigned as the 
thread’s current MSG_CTX_ID value (a current 
MSG_CTX_ID is created for the thread if the ID does not 
exist yet). Note that the MSG_CTX_ID may propagate 
across process/thread creation (as Fig. 2 illustrates); there-
fore, multiple threads’ current MSG_CTX_IDs can have 
same value. 
Handling TCP Message Fragmentation. TCP messages 
may be fragmented by the TCP library, and one transmit-
ted TCP message may be received by multiple recv() calls. 
There are also cases when messages transmitted by multi-
ple send() calls are received in one recv() call (or multiple 
recv() calls without one-to-one mapping between the send() 
calls and recv() calls). REPAgent handles the fragmentation 
during interception of the recv() calls. It first reads in the 
MSG_ID (a fixed number of bytes) and extracts the length 
information from the MSG_ID. It then reads in multiple 
messages until the specified length of bytes are received, 
and returns the merged bytes, i.e. the original message, to 
the upper application. In the same way, REPAgent is able 
to split/merge received messages and reconstruct the orig-
inal messages. Events are properly generated such that one 
recv event maps to one send event with the same MSG_ID.  
4 REPTRACE-BASED ANOMALY DETECTION 
REPTrace can be exploited for anomaly detection of the 
distributed platform behavior. The REptrace-based Anom-
aly Detection method, READ as the acronym, is composed 
of two stages: training stage and detection stage. The basic 
idea is that, a couple of finite state automatons (FSAs) are 
constructed from the REP during the training, and then the 
runtime behavior of a request processing is compared 
against the FSAs to detect anomalies. Though use of FSAs 
for anomaly detection is not new (Kewei’s work [27] is an 
example), an FSA built from individual request pro-
cessing’s complete end-to-end execution path among a dis-
tributed platform, is completely new. Hence, the anomaly 
detection approach based on this specific kind of FSA is 
novel. 
4.1 Training Stage 
In this stage we run a number of requests of the same type 
concurrently on the distributed platform, collect the REP 
for each of the requests, generate a Finite State Automaton 
(FSA) for each collected REP, and then merge these per-
path FSAs for all the requests of this type, into two aggre-
gated FSAs. The identifications of the parent-child relation-
ships along the execution link all the events into a DAG 
starting with each single request as the root event.  
By request type we mean the function of a service which 
is requested to be performed. For instances, provisioning 
of a VM, provisioning of a container, shutdown of a VM, 
migration of a VM are different types of requests sup-
ported by a cloud platform. In a platform with REST API 
exposed, usually different request types have different 
URLs and different request modes; in an example com-
mand “curl -ku user:passwd -X POST https://ip:port/service-
name/api/v1/the_url -d @jsonobj”, the_url and the request 
mode POST determine a request type. In a job processing 
The Cluster of the distributed system
Running service
Host 1
REPAgent
Local generator
Running service
Host N
REPAgent
Local generator
…
trace events
Running service
Host 2
REPAgent
Local generator
trace events trace events
Central generator
buffered  
trace events
Execution 
paths 
buffered 
trace events
buffered  
trace events
Execution 
paths
Execution 
paths 
Request execution path repository
App 1 App 2 App M
…
YONG ET AL.:  TRANSPARENTLY CAPTURING EXECUTION PATH OF SERVICE REQUEST PROCESSING FOR ANOMALY DETECTION 7 
 
platform like Hadoop, different applications are regarded 
as different types of job requests.  
The two aggregated FSAs will be employed to detect 
anomaly of the execution of this type of requests in real 
workload during the detection stage. We repeat this train-
ing for all types of requests of interest supported by the 
distributed platform, so execution anomalies in processing 
these types of requests can be detected. We aggregate FSAs 
for each request type rather than for all request types be-
cause the processing logics of different types of requests 
vary a lot (e.g. a VM-provisioning request is completely 
different from a VM-shutdown request), building a big 
FSA to tolerate their variations while still provide good de-
tection accuracy has unnecessary complexities, and the ac-
curacy may be sacrificed, too. As the request type infor-
mation is known at the beginning of the request processing, 
it is straightforward to do anomaly detection for each re-
quest type.  
4.1.1 Generating a Per-path FSA 
Fig. 4 illustrates the process of generating a per-path FSA 
from one request's REP. The process has the following steps.  
 
Fig. 4. The Process of Generating a Per-path FSA 
A. DAG-to-Tree Conversion 
REP is represented as a DAG because certain events have 
multiple parents when two or more rules in Section 2.3.2 
apply. This multi-parent circumstance brings about com-
putational complexity to the following steps of component 
identification and path pruning. We convert a DAG into a 
tree to facilitate these two steps. The conversion is not es-
sential for the loop/concurrency pruning, but mainly for 
efficiency of the pruning algorithms. Actually, in our ex-
periments less than 1% of event relationshiops are re-
moved during the conversion.  
The conversion is done by selecting only one parent re-
lationship for any event with multiple parents and remov-
ing the other parent relationships. We propose a subjective 
prioritization in deciding which rule (in Section 2.3.2) to 
observe when competing with the other rules, as below 
(from highest priority to lowest):   
Rule on type 3 > Rule on type 5 > Rule on type 4 > Rule on 
type 2 > Rule on type 1. 
The same prioritization is observed for all cases; so, the 
arbitration is deterministic. We select this arbitration prin-
ciple based on our understanding of typical impacts of dif-
ferent scenarios on request processing behavior. 
B. Component Identification 
This operation module identifies the list of components of 
the distributed system in processing the given request. 
Component identification is done because a component 
may have multiple processes/threads, and for human un-
derstanding of a system it is highly preferred to under-
stand interactions at the component level rather than the 
process/thread level. The event tree of the REP is first con-
verted to a process tree (or forest), and then the compo-
nents are identified from the process tree. The details of the 
component identification are available in [25].  
C. Loop/Concurrency Pruning 
There are lots of loops and concurrencies in processing of 
a service request. Without dealing with these iterative and 
concurrent substructures in the REPs, the false positive rate 
of an anomaly detection method based on the precise REPs 
will be high due to the variable iteration and concurrency 
number. Therefore, iteration and concurrency should be 
identified and pruned. After pruning, the identical itera-
tion and concurrency patterns of events are represented by 
only one copy for the further analysis, which hugely re-
duces the number of events and simplifies further pro-
cessing while does not lose the information of how many 
times the patterns are repeated (e.g. the iteration number 
of an iterative substructure is recorded during our pro-
cessing). The algorithm of the pruning is available in [25].  
D. FSA Construction 
An FSA is constructed directly from the pruned REP: each 
node of the pruned path (i.e. consolidated events) changes 
into an edge (transition) of the FSA, and each edge of the 
pruned path changes into a node of the FSA (state between 
two groups of consolidated events). A state St0 is added to 
the FSA before the first transition (i.e. root event) as the 
start state. Fig. 5 shows an example fragment of a con-
structed FSA from the pruned REP. An FSA state with out-
degree of 2 or more indicates either a branching scenario 
(conditional statement or loop, e.g. St4) or a concurrency 
(e.g. St5). During the loop/concurrency pruning we have 
information of whether a path fragment is a loop or con-
currency. Here we mark the concurrency-caused branching 
states (St5 and St12) as concurrency points in the built FSA.  
 Fig. 5. Example fragment of a built FSA 
Note that after we transform a REP into a per-request 
FSA, the FSA already contains cycles. An FSA with cycles 
can match infinite number of different execution paths. 
Though requests may have different input, we observe that 
the requests of same type with different input usually lead 
to different numbers of loops or repetitions of same event 
patterns, and such loops/repetitions are handled by cycles 
in FSA when we match the execution path against the FSA. 
Request executions with corner cases of input may be 
falsely alarmed and result in false positives, and our exper-
imental results report the false positives (Section 5.3).  
4.1.2 Generating aggregated FSAs for a request type 
After building an FSA for each REP, all FSAs for executions 
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of the same type of request are combined into two aggre-
gated FSAs, a core FSA and a full FSA, for anomaly detec-
tion.   
We observed that normal execution paths of the same 
type of requests may be slightly different due to various 
causes such as retries after failures, built-in non-determin-
ism in the distributed platform, etc. Therefore, using the 
FSA from only one execution path for anomaly detection 
suffers from a large number of false alarms. We address 
this issue by combining different FSAs of a request type to 
generate aggregated FSAs.  
The core FSA is the intersection of all the per-path FSAs, 
and the full FSA is the union of all the per-path FSAs. Thus, 
the core FSA represents the common execution path frag-
ments/state transitions for a request type, and the full FSA 
represents all the possible execution fragments/state tran-
sitions for all REPs of a request type. The combining pro-
cess is illustrated in Algorithm 2. The transition_path(S) 
function returns the transition sequence from a per-path 
FSA’s initial state St0 to a given state S.  
 
Annotating aggregated FSAs with time information. 
We enhance the two aggregated FSAs by annotating time 
information to each transition of the two FSAs. The anno-
tated time information is the average of the time spent on 
those REP trace events which were consolidated into this 
FSA transition during the step of Loop/Concurrency Pruning 
(Section 4.1.1 C) and the step of Generating aggregated FSAs 
above in this Section (recall that each REP trace event has 
the timestamp). The time annotation can be leveraged to de-
tect performance anomalies.    
4.2 Detection Stage  
The aggregated FSAs are applied to detect anomalies of re-
quest executions. The detection process starts when a re-
quest is first received by the distributed platform, e.g. at 
the portal of a cloud platform, at the first REST API com-
ponent of a request processing system, or at the Hadoop 
component that receives a user-initiated job request. Spe-
cifically, the request type is identified, the corresponding 
aggregated FSAs for the request type are selected, and the 
anomaly detection is performed against the aggregated 
FSAs.  
4.2.1 Identifying the request type 
As the REPTrace intercepts the network messages to and 
from all components of the target distributed platform, we 
add platform-specific handling in the interception of the 
component that receives external requests from clients. The 
platform-specific handling parses the external requests, 
identifies the request type, and sends the request type to 
the Central Generator (Fig. 2). Then the aggregated FSAs 
for this identified type of request are selected for anomaly 
detection in the following step.  
 Fig. 6. Detection of execution anomaly against aggregated FSAs 
4.2.2 Detecting Anomaly of Request Execution 
Fig. 6 shows the overall procedure of detecting execution 
anomaly against the two aggregated FSAs. Three modules 
run in parallel during the detection, and the modules 
maintain four data structures as the execution of the re-
quest goes on: a tree-form of the REP, a component list, the 
core FSA and the full FSA with the current states of the re-
quest execution marked in the two FSAs. Here we describe 
the behavior of the three modules.  
A. Determining event parent 
When a new REPTrace event is reported to the Central 
Generator, this module performs these two tasks: 
i) identifies the parent event of the incoming trace event 
based on the current REP and links the incoming event into 
this REP. The arbitration prioritization described in Section 
4.1.1 A is applied for multi-parent cases. Therefore, the re-
sult REP is a tree. The time complexity of this step is O(n) 
where n is the current number of events in this REP.  
ii) adds the component_id attribute to the new event 
based on the information of the component list. Then the 
event and its parent event are passed to the FSA driver.  
B. Component Identification 
After the REP is updated upon the new event, this mod-
ule processes the REP and updates the component list as 
described in Section 4.1.1 B.  
C. FSA Driver 
As the request may be executed by multiple compo-
nents of the distributed platform in parallel at a time, mul-
tiple events may be produced concurrently. This means the 
current state of the distributed platform in processing the 
request is actually captured as a set of active FSA states in 
both the core FSA and the full FSA (i.e., one active FSA state 
indicates the current state of one thread that is processing 
the request at this time), similar to tokens in a classical Pe-
tri-Net.  
Recall that a trace event of REPTrace maps into an FSA 
edge during FSA construction. So, when a pair of <current 
event, parent event> arrives, the FSA driver triggers state 
transition in each FSA by i) identifying the source FSA state 
which is one of the active FSA states and is also between 
two FSA edges matching the incoming events (match of 
ftype and component_id), and ii) transitioning the activeness 
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of the source state to the next FSA state according to the 
current event.  
Handling concurrency. A pthread_create/fork/vfork trace 
event generates two transitions and one active FSA state 
results in two active states as one more thread/process is 
created. Moreover, as this is online anomaly detection, an 
identified concurrency point of the FSAs (see Section 4.1.1 
D) stays active after it is activated, to deal with the scenar-
ios when events of concurrent operations arrive with large 
time gaps.  
Detecting Functional Anomalies. In one of the follow-
ing conditions, an anomaly is detected.  
• The <parent event, current event> pair cannot trig-
ger a transition in the full FSA, i.e., the match fails and the 
source FSA state cannot be identified.  
• At least one transition of the core FSA is not trav-
ersed by the execution when the request processing fin-
ishes. As events arrive frequently during the execution, 
when no event of the request processing arrives within a 
threshold period of time (5 seconds in our experiments), it 
is considered the request processing completed.   
When an anomaly is detected, the detailed information 
of the corresponding transition/event, the collected REP 
and the component list is available for further investiga-
tion and diagnosis. 
Detecting Performance Anomalies. The aggregated 
FSAs are annotated with time information. A performance 
anomaly is detected when the measured time in the current 
event is longer than the annotated time information of the 
transition by a given threshold percentage (100% used in 
our experiments as a subjective selection).  
5 EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION  
We implemented a prototype of REPTrace on Linux distri-
butions and the source code can be found on GitHub [19]. 
Our current implementation intercepts 28 LIBC calls via 
the LD_PRELOAD mechanism on Linux, including the 
POSIX library calls on network operations and pro-
cess/thread operations as listed in Table 1.  
    Experiment Setup. The scenarios evaluated include:  
a) comparison of the tracings of the WordCount appli-
cation on Hadoop (including Yarn, MapReduce and HDFS) 
by REPTrace and vPath, for evaluating the correctness and 
completeness of the REPTrace; 
b) overhead analysis for the tracings of applications by 
REPTrace, on Hadoop, Spark, Tensorflow (for image clas-
sification using SVM) and Angel [20]; 
c) REPTrace-based anomaly detection for four typical 
applications on Hadoop (i.e. four request types, as a differ-
ent application is regarded as a different request type for 
the Hadoop job processing system): Kmeans, WordCount, 
Grep and TopN.  
The workloads in our experiments include WordCount, 
Grep, Kmeans, TopN, Teragen and Terasort on Hadoop, 
WordCount on Spark, Logistic Regression on Angel and 
SVM on Tensorflow. These workloads are classical and 
common workloads for Hadoop, Spark, TensorFlow and 
Angel, respectively. For each application (request type) we 
run 10 jobs (requests) for overhead evaluation, 20 jobs for 
the training stage of the anomaly detection, and 28 normal 
jobs, 48 fault injected jobs for the detection stage. The ex-
periments were conducted on 2 KVM virtual machines on 
a Dell R730 server. Each VM has 4 cores of Intel Xeon E5-
2603, 4GB main memory and Ubuntu 16.04. 
5.1 Request Execution Path Analysis 
We conducted experiments to compare vPath and REP-
Trace on tracing of the WordCount application on Hadoop 
with a 500M input file. We got the vPath source code from 
the authors of the vPath. 
vPath averagely generates 28,908 trace events while 
REPTrace averagely generates 39,555 trace events. We in-
vestigate a subset of the events and confirm the events and 
their relationships captured by vPath are all captured by 
REPTrace. However, vPath produces 1,153 execution path 
fragments, while REPTrace produces 6 execution path frag-
ments for one job execution before the handling of data de-
pendency relationships in REPTrace is invoked. vPath pro-
duces much larger number of fragments because it only 
supports a constrained communication/thread pattern.  
After we invoke REPTrace’s handling of Hadoop job 
ID/RPC ID (a plugin of REPTrace for supporting Hadoop’s 
data dependency relationships), the 6 execution path frag-
ments are linked together to form a single complete REP 
for the job request. We then looked into the events of sev-
eral REP paths, and did not find any error in inspected re-
lationships of the paths (via manual inspection of a num-
ber of generated REPs and relevant source code), i.e. all in-
spected ones reflect the real event relationships as expected 
and as specified in Section 2.3.2. 
5.1.1 Case Analysis  
vPath reports more than one thousand path fragments for 
processing of one request because Hadoop RPC and cer-
tain communication mechanisms in Hadoop do not sup-
port vPath’s assumed pattern, which is described in Sec-
tion 1.  
 Fig. 7. Hadoop RPC and its partial REP 
Fig. 7(a) shows a simplified Hadoop RPC client imple-
mentation. An RPC client calls call() to send an RPC request 
to an RPC server, which creates a new connection and sets 
up I/O streams for this connection. In setupIOstreams(), the 
RPC client calls getNegotiatedProperty() to receive necessary 
authentication information from the connection. Then the 
RPC client launches a thread to receive RPC responses and 
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another thread to send the RPC request via this connection. 
The expected REP fragmemt for this scenario (starting 
from receiving the negotiation information), which is the 
same as the REP fragment generated by REPTrace, is 
shown in Fig. 7(b). The REP fragments produced by vPath 
are shown in Fig. 7(c). The events of the same request are 
identified as three path fragments by vPath. Here are two 
cases when vPath fail to link events correctly.  
Case 1. vPath assumes that after receiving a request X 
(recv-request-X event), the same thread will emit subordi-
nate request Y (send-request-Y) to another component, 
block itself, receive the reply from that component, and 
then reply to request X (send-reply-X). But this assumption 
fails to hold in the scenario above where the recv-request-X 
event and send-request-Y event occur at different threads. 
This request-reply pattern is widely used in Hadoop, espe-
cially in Hadoop RPC which is used by Hadoop compo-
nents to communicate with each other.  
So vPath fails to capture the relationships between one 
thread’s recv event and the send events of the thread’s child 
threads. This thread pattern is handled by REPTrace prop-
agating MSG_CTX_ID across thread/process creation, as 
discussed in Section 2.3.2 Type 1 and Type 2 parts.  
Case 2. vPath also assumes synchronous network com-
munication that a thread sends a request message over a 
TCP connection and then blocks until the corresponding 
reply message comes back over the same TCP connection. 
However, as shown in Fig. 7(a), RPC client starts a thread 
to perform sendRpcRequest() and another thread to perform 
receiveRpcResponse(). The send and recv are asynchronous 
and are not done within same thread.  
Therefore, vPath fails to connect these two events and 
produces two unrelated path fragments. REPTrace doesn’t 
depend on the synchronous communication pattern. In-
stead, REPTrace employs MSG_ID and MSG_CTX_ID cas-
cadingly to maintain request context across components, 
and is able to identify the asynchronous send and recv in 
two threads are in the same request processing, and link 
them into the same path.  
5.2 Overhead Analysis 
There are two types of overhead by using REPTrace to trace 
a distributed system: increase of the request latency and 
increase of network traffic due to the transmission of extra 
information such as MSG_ID. Specifically,  
• Latency Overhead = (average latency with REPTrace – average 
latency without REPTrace)/average latency without REPTrace 
• Traffic Overhead = size of MSG_ID/average size of messages 
Each application of each system is run 10 times for the 
overhead analysis. Table 2 presents the results. 
Table 2 shows that REPTrace captures REPs for different 
distributed platforms with a 4.5% average latency over-
head and a 1.8% average traffic overhead. A smaller aver-
age size of messages leads to a higher traffic overhead. Ten-
sorflow’s traffic is mainly for the parameter synchroniza-
tion between the worker and the parameter server to up-
date the parameters of machine learning models; it has 
much smaller message sizes compared to other distributed 
systems in the table. Consequently, Tensorflow’s traffic 
overhead is higher. 
TABLE 2: RESULTS OF THE OVERHEAD ANALYSIS 
 
5.3 Functional Anomaly Detection  
During the training stage we run 20 jobs for each of the 4 
applications on Hadoop (see the experiment setup at be-
ginning of Section 5 for details), with different input files 
of different sizes. The numbers of trace events vary with 
the input size. For a WordCount job with 500M input file, 
the average number of trace events in the reported REPs is 
39,550 and the built full FSA has 16,297 states.  
Fault injection. We use fault injection to evaluate the 
detection performance. We inject 6 categories of failures: 
Output path collision, Namenode crash, Datanode crash, 
Resource Manager crash, NodeManager crash and Runjar 
crash. For the output path collision, we started a Hadoop 
job request and then had another task to lock the output 
path of the request processing. For other categories of fail-
ures, we killed the corresponding component process after 
we confirmed the process is running and the processing of 
the request already started. All of the failures are activated 
and manifested in our experiments.  
Results. For each application, we ran 28 normal jobs 
and 48 jobs with fault injection (8 jobs for each of the 6 fail-
ure categories). Therefore, there are 304 jobs in total, 112 
without fault injection and 192 with fault injection. We use 
all of the 20 REPs constructed during training to train the 
anomaly detection; the results are summarized in Table 3.  
TABLE 3: FUNCTIONAL ANOMALY DETECTION RESULTS OF FOUR AP-
PLICATIONS (FSA-20) 
Application Precision Recall F1-measure 
Grep 0.98 0.85 0.91 
Kmeans 0.92 1 0.96 
TopN 0.84 1 0.91 
WordCount 1 1 1 
Average 0.93 0.96 0.94 
We also evaluate the impact of the number of training 
REPs and event pruning on the detection performance. The 
anomaly detection results for four models are listed in Ta-
ble 4.  
• FSA in the table refers to an FSA model directly built 
from one REP for each application without pruning loop 
or concurrency. As only one REP path is used, there is 
only one FSA constructed and there is no core FSA or full 
FSA.  
• eFSA refers to an FSA model built from one REP for each 
application with pruning of loop and concurrency. There 
is only one FSA and no core FSA or full FSA.  
• FSA-n refers to a core FSA and a full FSA built from n 
training REPs (n<=20 as 20 jobs are executed in training) 
for each application, with loop and concurrency pruning. 
Systems Applications Latency 
Overhead
Traffic 
Overhead
Hadoop
WordCount 6.0% 0.8%
Teragen 4.6% 0.2%
Terasort 4.0% 0.3%
Spark WordCount 4.4% 0.3%
Angel Logistic Regression 4.8% 0.9%
Tensorflow SVM Classification 3.1% 8.2%
Average - 4.5% 1.8%
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TABLE 4: FUNCTIONAL ANOMALY DETECTION RESULTS WITH DIF-
FERENT MODELS 
Model Precision Recall F1-measure 
FSA 0.034 1 0.07 
eFSA 0.426 1 0.60 
FSA-10 0.837 1 0.91 
FSA-20 0.930 0.96 0.94 
Table 4 shows that without pruning of loop and concur-
rency, FSA has very low precision, which indicates huge 
false positives because normal jobs’ execution paths differ 
with each other due to iteration, concurrency, fault toler-
ance or built-in non-determinism. eFSA improves the pre-
cision from FSA and reduces the false postives after prun-
ing loop and concurrency, but the false positives are still 
pretty high. FSA-10 and FSA-20, by combining the core 
FSA model and the full FSA model from multiple normal 
REPs, alleviate the false positive issue to an acceptable 
level. With FSA-20, the average functional anomaly detec-
tion precision is 93% and the recall is 96%, which shows 
that the REPTrace-based Anomaly Detection (READ) has a 
strong capability to detect functional anomalies. 
5.4 Performance Anomaly Detection  
To evaluate the performance anomaly detection, three 
types of performance faults are injected to the running Ha-
doop systems, as Table 5 lists, while jobs are running. We 
ran 9 normal jobs and 9 jobs with fault injection for each of 
the 4 applications, 3 jobs for each of the three fault types. 
Therefore, there are 72 jobs in total, 36 with fault injection 
and 36 without. On average, READ achieves a 74% preci-
sion and a 74% recall for performance anomaly detection. 
We analyzed the factors that limit the precision and recall 
of performance anomaly detection. The results show that 
more advanced mechanism than our simple threshold-
based detection should be explored in our future work. 
TABLE 5: PERFORMANCE ANOAMALY DETECTION RESULTS OF IN-
JECTED PERFORMANCE FAULTS  
Performance Fault Precision Recall F1-measure 
CPU burning 0.70 0.78 0.74 
High network latency 0.88 0.78 0.83 
Full disks 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Average 0.74 0.74 0.74 
6 RELATED WORK 
6.1 End-to-end Tracing Systems 
End-to-end tracing has been a fertile research area and 
there exist various implementations in both academia [1], 
[3], [7], [11], [12], [13], [15], [18] and industry [6], [16], [17]. 
Pinpoint [11] instruments J2EE to accurately correlate the 
network communication events by adding request identi-
fier in HTTP request headers and correlate intra-unit 
events by automatically propagating request identifiers 
with thread local variables of a thread. Stardust [15] is an 
end-to-end tracing system designed for specific distributed 
storage system, which requires manual modification of the 
storage system to generate the request execution path. 
Xtrace [13] mainly focuses on extending network protocols 
to support request identifier propagation to generate task 
trees. Dapper [6] is Google’s internal distributed tracing 
system serving various clusters. Dapper instruments inter-
nal homogeneous control flow/RPC libraries to generate 
request execution path without source code modification 
of upper applications. HTrace [17] is a Dapper-like end-to-
end tracing framework, which has been integrated with 
HDFS and HBase.  
Stardust requires manual modification of the distrib-
uted storage system. Pinpoint, Dapper, Pivot and Canopy 
deal with specific middleware or vendor custom libraries 
only. HTrace requires instrumentation to the system to en-
able tracing. Certain hardware and application support is 
demanded for Xtrace to work.  
A project close to our work is vPath [7]. This project 
made a thrust to provide a generic solution of tracing dis-
tributed systems/applications by monitoring thread and 
network activities. vPath only deals with TCP-based sys-
tem/applications and assumes certain communication 
styles and thread patterns. For example, vPath assumes 
that i) any thread A, after it sends a message to thread B, it 
must wait until receiving the response from B; A should 
not send or receive another message during the wait; ii) 
any component P, after it receives a message from an up-
stream component Q, all subordinate messages from P to 
downstream components must be sent by the same thread 
of P which receives the Q's message. These are very strict 
assumptions of communication styles and thread patterns, 
and do not hold in many modern distributed systems. As 
a result, vPath generates many execution path fragments 
rather than an accurate complete execution path for one re-
quest in many scenarios, as demonstrated in our evalua-
tion.  
There are also works that apply statistical technologies 
to logs of the distributed components for correlating log 
events. They apply statistical analysis [8, 14], code analysis 
[10], time series analysis [5], or timestamps [4，9] to spec-
ulate the request execution path. Because many events are 
not exposed by the logs, these technologies cannot capture 
the accurate complete execution path of fine-grained 
events for individual request and just try to probabilisti-
cally matching logs events with statistical inference or 
identify certain statistical patterns. 
6.2 Anomaly Detection of Distributed Systems 
Previous research works make use of different types of 
runtime data to perform anomaly detection in distributed 
system, such as log, monitoring data or tracing data.  
Fu [21] leverages log data and assumes that there is a 
thread ID or request ID for every log event to classify all 
the logs into different log sequence according to their ID 
information and timestamp. An FSA (Finite State Automa-
ton) is built for each component of distributed system 
based on the log sequences. Then the built FSAs are used 
to perform workflow and performance anomaly detection. 
Due to its sequence model, it fails to depict the concurrency 
in a request and is limited to a single component without 
correlating the log events from other components or hosts. 
Wang [22] uses monitoring data to build anomaly detec-
tion model based on different monitoring metric. But it can 
only detetect the overall performance anomaly and is not 
applicable to functional anomaly and request execution 
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performance anomalies. Sambasivan [23] diagnose both 
workflow and performance anomaly by comparing execu-
tion paths generated by Stardust. It identifies parallel sub-
structures of request execution path but fails to find the it-
erative substructure of a request execution path. So, there 
will be a lot of false alarms when applying it to a distrib-
uted system with frequent iteration. We are not the first one 
to exploit FSA to detection anomiles. KeWei [27] proposed 
an FSA-based problem detection approach. This approach 
parses log events, uses <component, log  point> tuples as the 
finite states, uses temporal order as the transitions for 
states, to build a FSA for all possible service requests. Tem-
poral order is not accurate to capture the transitions be-
tween these states to build an accurate FSA. Meanwhile, its 
detection is based on the historical states transition fre-
quency between any two states, which doesn’t consider the 
context of the current state. 
7 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose REPTrace, a generic end-to-end 
tracing methodology, which automatically generates the 
complete execution path of service/job requests for a vari-
ety of distributed platforms in a transparent way. We ana-
lyzed possible request execution scenarios during distrib-
uted platforms' request processing and corresponding 
causal relationships, and introduced how REPTrace cap-
tures the accurate causal relationships in these scenarios. 
We conducted experiments to compare with vPath. Our re-
sults show that REPTrace has much better performance in 
terms of generality and accuracy because REPTrace is not 
limited to certain network communications styles or 
thread patterns as vPath is. In our experiments REPTrace 
has a low execution latency overhead (4.5%) and low net-
work traffic overhead (1.8%).  We also devise an anomaly 
detection mechanism based on REPTrace to detect anoma-
lies of request execution. The experiments on Hadoop 
show that functional anomalies are detected with 93% pre-
cison and 96% recall by leveraging the REPs.  
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